Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

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13 September 1960

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Copy No. C 74

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 11
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: _____ REVIEWER:

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DAILY BRIEF (b)(3)

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Tunisia-Algeria: President Bourguiba, whose restrictions on Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia have hampered rebel operations in Algeria, appears to be adopting a more permissive attitude toward the FLN. His recent public speeches indicate a change in attitude, and he reportedly now has agreed to permit "volunteers" for the Algerian fighting, including any that might be sent from Communist China, to transit Tunisia. Bourguiba presumably is motivated by a number of factors, including disillusion with De Gaulle's Algerian policy, concern that the FLN might sabotage the newly opened oil pipeline from Saharan Algeria to the Tunisian coast, and even fear of an FLN-engineered assassination attempt. (b)(3)
(Page 3)

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

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Congo: The Security Council's decision on 12 September to adjourn indefinitely its consideration of the Congo crisis will probably be viewed by Premier Lumumba as a victory over Secretary General Hammarskjold and may encourage him to attempt a new assault on UN-held installations in Leopoldville--the radio station and airfields. In the Congo capital, Lumumba continues to resist the efforts of President Kasavubu to remove him from office. Army units arrested the premier on 12 September under a warrant signed by Kasavubu and took him to a local army camp, but within a few hours the premier was back in Leopoldville. He toured the city and denounced the attempted coup against him. Meanwhile, the National Assembly backed the premier by cabling the UN not to recognize Justin Bomboko--Kasavubu's choice for new foreign minister. Lumumba also received support from the UAR when Cairo reportedly decided to withdraw its force of 515 men from the UN command in the Congo, charging the UN had violated Congo sovereignty. (Page 5)

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

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(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

Tunisian President Gives Firmer Support to Algerian Rebels

President Bourguiba, whose restrictions on National Liberation Front (FLN) activity in Tunisia have hampered rebel operations in Algeria, appears to be adopting a somewhat more permissive attitude toward the FLN. He reportedly stated recently that he might permit a convoy to cross Tunisia with much-needed arms and ammunition for the rebel army in Algeria. [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] he has agreed to allow "volunteers" from other (b)(1)
countries--including any which might be sent from Communist China--to pass through Tunisia on their way to Algeria. He recently publicly reaffirmed his support for the FLN and sharply criticized France.

Bourguiba continues to be deeply concerned over the disruptive effects of the Algerian rebellion on North Africa in general and on Tunisia in particular. He is also faced with the immediate security problem engendered by the presence of an estimated 10,000 rebel troops within his country's borders. As a result, although he has publicly championed the rebel cause, he has sharply restricted the movement of troops and supplies within Tunisia. At the same time, he has attempted to act as a mediator between France and the FLN. His apparent shift toward closer identification with the FLN probably is motivated partly by disappointment with De Gaulle's Algerian policy and partly by concern that the FLN might sabotage the new oil pipeline from Saharan Algeria to the Tunisian coast. In addition, Bourguiba reportedly believes that the restrictions he has imposed on the FLN have made him an assassination target for the rebels, and he may be attempting to placate the Algerian leaders.

Bourguiba is also assisting in the rebel campaign to bring the Algerian dispute into international forums. He stated on 3 September that the Tunisians are ready "to join our fate with that of Algeria if this union would hasten the end of the war." [redacted] have recently announced that their government and the provisional Algerian government are studying ways (b)(1)

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to achieve "an eventual organic and political fusion of Tunisia and Algeria." Such a move presumably would be designed to give the rebel government a certain amount of official standing during the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

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Situation in Congo

The Security Council's decision on 12 September to adjourn its consideration of the Congo crisis indefinitely will probably be viewed by Premier Lumumba as a victory over Secretary General Hammarskjold. The Security Council, however, may send a fact-finding subcommittee to the Congo with additional instructions to seek mediation between Lumumba and Kasavubu factions. The premier had asked that no resolution be passed because he feared that such action would strengthen Hammarskjold's hand in the Congo and restrict his own freedom of action against Katanga and moderates in the Congo. Lumumba now may be encouraged to attempt a new assault on UN-held installations in Leopoldville--the radio station and the airfields.

Although there have been indications that Kasavubu was improving his position, Premier Lumumba now appears to have regained some of the initiative. On 13 September, he repeated his threat to seek aid outside the UN. President Tshombé of Katanga has weakened Kasavubu's group--which he is considered to favor--by declaring for an independent Katanga and by refusing to accept the post of vice president in the new government. Hammarskjold is still convinced that he must break Lumumba and that he will be able to do it. He is prepared to turn down any Lumumba demand for UN withdrawal.

Premier Lumumba was arrested on 12 September on a warrant issued by Kasavubu, but was soon released, and toured Leopoldville boasting of the failure of the plot against him. On 12 September the National Assembly supported Lumumba when it cabled the Security Council, that "the Bomboko delegation is not recognized by the Parliament, and cannot be received by the Security Council or speak on behalf of the Congo." The premier has had strong support from the USSR, and has recently received backing from Ghana and the UAR. On 11 September Ghana condemned the government named by Kasavubu as "bogus" and declared it would be inadmissible for the UN to recognize it as the Congo government. On 12 September, Cairo radio announced

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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C03174708

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that the UAR had decided to withdraw its 515-man contingent from the UN forces in the Congo rather than face the possibility of clashes with Congolese troops. On 7 September, the UAR chargé in Leopoldville suggested that Cairo reassure Lumumba of its complete readiness to respond to the Congolese government's request for military assistance, and ask Lumumba for specific information as to requirements. The assignment of a top official in the UAR foreign ministry--Dr. Murad Ghalib--as ambassador in Leopoldville may lead to a further strengthening of UAR influence in the Congo following his arrival expected on 13 September.

Two Soviet cargo vessels--the Voroshilov and the Krasnodar--are off the West African coast and may be heading for the Congo. On 11 September they were off Guinea and proceeding southward.

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